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THE FUTURE OF OFF-LABEL MARKETING REGULATIONS 
IN THE POST-SORRELL ERA 
Jared Iraggi* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With expanding constitutional protection of corporate speech 
rights, the Supreme Court is poised to consider the next big 
challenge: off-label marketing restrictions enforced by the federal 
government.  The First Amendment challenge to the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) off-label marketing guidelines has been 
brewing for over a decade; with the recent Supreme Court decision 
in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., it seems likely that the challenge will work 
its way back on to the Federal Court docket.1 
Off-label is the practice of using prescription drugs for purposes 
that have not been specifically approved by the FDA.2  It is estimated 
that twenty percent of prescriptions in America are for off-label uses.3  
The practice is most commonly seen in pediatrics, psychiatry, and 
oncology.4  For diseases affecting a very small subset of the 
population, or for high-risk illnesses, off-label prescriptions are often 
a patient’s only available treatment option.5  While physicians are free 
to prescribe drugs for any off-label indication that meets the 
appropriate medical standard of care, drug companies are prohibited 
from marketing products for any purpose that is not specifically 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law.  Thank you to my 
family and friends for your continued support.  Erin, you continue to inspire me in 
every way; I am so grateful for your support, assistance, and companionship. Thank 
you to my editors, who have donated so much of their time over the past several 
months. 
 1  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 2  Randall S. Stafford, M.D., Ph.D, Regulating Off-label Drug Use—Rethinking the 
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1427, 1428 (Apr. 3, 2008). 
 3  Radley, Finkelstein, & Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based 
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1021–26 (2006). 
 4  Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened 
Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 476 (2009). 
 5  Gregory Gentry, Criminalizing Knowledge: The Perverse Implications of the Intended 
Use Regulations for Off-Label Promotion Prosecutions, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 441, 442 
(2009). 
IRAGGI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  2:07 PM 
1138 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1137 
included on the product labeling (i.e. off-label indications).6 
Drug manufacturers have a vested interest in the regulations 
governing the prescription and marketing of off-label drugs.  They 
invest hundreds of millions of dollars to push potential medications 
through the cumbersome FDA-approval process; the estimated 
average cost to bring a new drug to market in the United States is just 
under $900 million.7  This lofty capital investment gives 
pharmaceutical manufacturers significant incentive to see their brand 
name drug prescribed widely and often. 
The bottom-line leaves drug manufacturers hoping that their 
drug is prescribed for a variety of diseases.  Unfortunately, when 
pushing a drug through the FDA approval process, companies rarely 
seek approval to treat multiple illnesses.8  More commonly, a 
company will seek approval for a few targeted applications and hope 
that physicians prescribe the drug for other reasons as well.9  
Physicians are free to prescribe medications to patients for reasons 
other than those listed on the manufacturer’s product insert.10 
While physicians are free to prescribe FDA-approved 
medications for any reason they deem medically appropriate, drug 
manufacturers are prohibited from marketing their products for off-
label indications.11  The consequences are often catastrophic for 
manufacturers guilty of off-label marketing violations, including fines 
in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.12  In 2009, for example, 
Pfizer paid a fine of $2.3 billion to the FDA for off-label marketing of 
their drug Bextra.13  Such damaging fines give pharmaceutical 
 
 6  Stafford, supra note 2, at 1427. 
 7  Greater Access to Generic Drugs: New FDA Initiatives to Improve the Drug Review 
Process and Reduce Legal Loopholes, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2006), 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143545.htm 
(“According to the Boston-based Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, 
the cost to develop a new drug averages $897 million.”). 
 8  See Dresser, supra note 4, at 476. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  John E. Osbourne, Can I Tell the Truth: A Comparative Perspective on Regulating 
Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 
301, 303 (2010); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), (b), (d) (2012). 
 12  Antonia Guiliani, Statistics for Off-Label Marketing Settlements Involving Prescription 
Drugs, KELLEY DRYE WARREN LLP (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.fcaalert.com/2011/03 
/articles/settlements-1/statistics-for-offlabel-marketing-settlements-involving-
prescription-drugs/. 
 13  Thomas Burton, The Free Speech Pill: Drug Firms See Opening to Push for End to Off-
Label Marketing Ban, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203707504577012382844711146 
.html. 
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companies considerable incentive to challenge off-label marketing 
regulations, leaving some scholars to speculate that pharmaceutical 
companies have begun challenging violations on First Amendment 
grounds.14 
Off-label marketing regulations have long been criticized for 
their imprecision and unpredictable standards.15  The government 
prosecutes off-label marketing violations in two manners: through the 
Food and Drug Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Federal False Claims 
Act (FCA).16  The FDCA sets forth the regulations for manufacturing 
and branding pharmaceuticals in the United States.17  The 
misbranding provision allows prosecutors to punish companies that 
make assertions inconsistent with their products’ approved drug 
labels.18  The FDA has offered little guidance to define the scope of 
this provision, leaving drug manufacturers eager to see its demise.19 
Recently, pharmaceutical companies were given new 
ammunition to fight the federal guidelines with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sorrell.20  The Court held that the practice of data mining, 
used by pharmaceutical companies to create more effective detailing 
practices,21 constitutes protected speech under the First 
Amendment.22  The Court determined that Vermont’s law, which 
proscribed pharmacies from selling information regarding physician 
prescription patterns, created both speaker-based and content-based 
speech restrictions.23  The majority in Sorrell held that the law was 
unconstitutionally burdensome on the company’s free speech 
rights.24  The Court found that the State’s justifications for the law 
were substantial but that the means to achieve those ends were not 
 
 14  Id.  See also Kevin Outterson. The Last Drug Company Settlement for Off-Label 
Promotion, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2011), http://theincidentaleconomist 
.com/wordpress/the-last-drug-company-settlement-for-off-label-promotion/. 
 15  Bennett, Kalb, McPhee & Klasmeier, Citizen Petition to the FDA (Jul. 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/allergan0900006480eba5de%5B1%5D 
.pdf. 
 16  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
 17  21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
 18  21 U.S.C. § 352(a). 
 19  See Osbourne, supra note 11, at 316–17. 
 20  See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 21  “Detailing” is the practice of marketing prescription drugs to healthcare 
professionals with the intent to induce the healthcare professionals to prescribe a 
certain prescription drug more readily.  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. at 2672. 
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narrowly tailored.25 
The primary purpose of this Comment is to discuss the 
likelihood of success for the imminent judicial challenge to off-label 
marketing regulations following Sorrell.  Sorrell’s application of strict 
scrutiny within the context of a corporate free speech action is novel, 
while the decision’s dicta are also powerfully predictive.  In future 
challenges, drug companies will be required to counter any state’s 
assertions that the off-label marketing restrictions are narrowly 
tailored to achieve a substantial State interest.  Doing so will require 
pharmaceutical companies to persuade the Court that there are 
reasonable, less restrictive alternatives to the current regulations. 
Part II of this Comment begins with a discussion of the history 
and practice of off-label marketing, as well as the federal regulations 
overseeing the practice.  That section addresses the almost dizzying 
connection of federal statutes and regulations that the government 
uses to justify prosecution of off-label marketing.  Next, Part III 
analyzes the Supreme Court decision in Sorrell, addressing the 
relevant First Amendment issues, applicable legal doctrines, and 
future implications of the case.  In Part IV, this Comment addresses 
additional significant cases that have previously been decided by 
courts on the off-label marketing issue.  Included in the analysis is the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Caronia.  
Part V confronts how the Court might handle a First Amendment 
challenge to off-label marketing in the future.  Part VI includes a 
detailed analysis of a quota system as an alternative, and how such a 
system may or may not be a practical alternative to the current 
regulatory mechanism. Ultimately, this Comment predicts that the 
Court will deem the current regulatory scheme unconstitutional, as 
the proposed alternative quota system is a potential alternative to 
achieving the government interest. 
II. CURRENT STATE OF OFF-LABEL REGULATIONS 
A. Drug Approval and Labeling Regulations and Interpretation 
Off-label marketing occurs when a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
endorses a drug for uses that have not passed FDA approval.26  Drugs 
are approved for a narrow set of conditions; they are not approved 
for universal use.27  For example, when a drug has been proven safe 
 
 25  Id. 
 26  Stafford, supra note 2, at 1021. 
 27  Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (2006) (noting that an application for a new drug 
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and effective in clinical trials to treat cardiac arrhythmia, the FDA 
might grant approval of the drug, but only for the purpose of treating 
cardiac arrhythmia.  The drug’s labeling and specific use will not 
include information about its efficacy for other disorders.28 
When a drug manufacturer proposes a new drug for the 
treatment of a given disorder, it must follow express FDA 
regulations.29  The process includes extensive clinical trials.30  These 
trials enable the manufacturer to demonstrate that the proposed 
drug is safe and effective for each of its intended uses.31  Following 
these tests, the manufacturer must show that the drug performed 
safely and effectively in well-controlled clinical trials conducted by 
qualified scientific experts.32  Unless the drug’s labeling represents 
the conclusions of these studies accurately, the drug will be 
considered mislabeled.33 
Different documents define the term “labeling” differently.  
“Labeling” under the FDCA is defined narrowly; it includes all 
tangible materials that accompany a drug.34  The FDA guidelines, 
however, define “labeling” more broadly; the FDA includes practically 
any materials or information that the manufacturer or its employees 
might produce —whether accompanying the drug or not.35  This casts 
a significantly broader net and has pervasive implications in terms of 
the Justice Department’s ability to prosecute off-label marketing 
actions.36 
 
 
will be denied if it does not “include adequate tests by all methods reasonably 
applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use under the conditions 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof”). 
 28  Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (a product label “shall not be considered to be false or 
misleading under this paragraph if the health care economic information directly 
relates to an indication approved under section 355 of this title or under 
section 262(a) of title 42 for such drug and is based on competent and reliable 
scientific evidence”). 
 29  See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
 30  21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3). 
 31  Id. 
 32  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). (“If the Secretary determines, based on relevant 
science, that data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation and 
confirmatory evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation) are sufficient to 
establish effectiveness, the Secretary may consider such data and evidence to 
constitute substantial evidence for purposes of the preceding sentence.” ). 
 33  21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2012). 
 34  21 U.S.C. § 321(m), (p) (2012). 
 35  Osbourne, supra note 11, at 308 (citing 21 C.F.R § 202.1 (2009)). 
 36  Id. (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 64074, 64085 (Dec. 3, 1997)). 
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B. Prosecution for Violations of Off-Label Marketing Regulations 
Through the FDCA and FCA 
i. Violations under the FDCA for Introducing a Misbranded 
Drug into Interstate Commerce 
The Justice Department currently enforces off-label marketing 
violations through the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act’s Labeling and 
Misbranding provisions.  It might come as a surprise that there is not 
in fact any express proscription of off-label marketing of 
pharmaceuticals in the FDCA.37  Rather, the federal government 
enforces the policy through a number of other means, including 
misbranding and mislabeling provisions.38  As noted above, the FDCA 
sets forth the labeling rules that manufacturers must abide by in 
order to develop and distribute pharmaceuticals in the United 
States.39 
Enforcement decisions are based on a set of guidelines 
established by the FDA in accordance with its interpretation of the 
FDCA.40  Once a drug completes the extensive FDA approval process, 
the manufacturer’s “labeling” must then expressly specify all 
“intended uses” for which it has been approved.41  Claims that the 
company makes regarding efficacy for any type of treatment will 
qualify as “intended uses” of the drug.42  The FDA regulations require 
that all “intended uses,” and associated “adequate instructions for 
use,” be found on the product label.43  According to John Osbourne, 
“intended use” includes “all uses objectively intended by the drug 
manufacturer based upon statements made in labeling, 
advertisements, or in written or oral statements by company 
representatives.”44  As such, when a company makes an assertion 
about its drug, it is making a statement about the drug’s “intended 
use.”45  If that “intended use,” or associated “adequate instructions for 
 
 37  See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (“A drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded . . . 
[i]f its labeling is false or misleading in any particular. . . information . . . [but it] 
shall not be considered false or misleading if . . . information directly relates to an 
indication approved under section 355 or under section 262(a) of title 42 for such 
drug and is based on competent and reliable scientific evidence.”). 
 38  Osbourne, supra note 11, at 308. 
 39  See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2012); see also, 21 C.F.R. § 201.1–201.58. 
 40  See id. 
 41  21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 355(a), (b), (j) (2012). 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Osbourne, supra note 11, at 309 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2009)). 
 45  Osbourne, supra note 11, at 309–10. 
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use,” are not found on the product’s label, the FDA determines that 
the manufacturer misbranded the drug.46  The FDCA makes it a 
crime for a company to distribute, or introduce, misbranded drugs 
into the stream of interstate commerce.47 
Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that 
the FDA’s enforcement of off-label marketing under the FDCA, in 
Caronia’s instance, treats making truthful assertions regarding off-
label indications as an act of misbranding itself.48  The government’s 
enforcement of the FDCA treats off-label marketing assertions as 
more than evincing intent to perform a future act of misbranding.49  
That is, when a detailer approaches a doctor and makes a valid and 
truthful claim about the efficacy of Drug X for treating non-approved 
Indication Y, his act of making this assertion is an instance of 
misbranding under the government’s interpretation.  In this sense, 
the truthful speech is criminalized.50  As addressed below, under the 
First Amendment the government will likely be prohibited from 
restricting truthful non-misleading speech in this manner.51 
ii. Violations under the False Claims Act 
Alternatively, companies can be held liable under the federal 
False Claims Act.52  A person violates the FCA when he or she 
knowingly submits or causes to be submitted a false or fraudulent 
claim for payment or approval.53  Generally, Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) will only authorize payments for outpatient drugs if 
the drug is determined to be “safe and effective.”54  Drugs are 
considered “safe and effective” if they are used for a “medically 
accepted indication.”55  A “medically accepted indication” is one that 
has been approved by the FDA, included in one of several specified 
compendia, or is supported by sufficient citations in approved 
 
 46  Id. at 310. 
 47  See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012). 
 48  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 49   See Hyman, Phelps & McNamara PC, A Deep Dive into the Second Circuit’s 
Caronia Decision, Potential Next Steps, and Potential Enforcement Fallout, FDA LAWBLOG 
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/12 
/a-deep-dive-into-the-second-circuits-caronia-decision-potential-next-steps-and-
potential-enforcement.html. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Osbourne, supra note 11, at 310 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006)). 
 53  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 54  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 55  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
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medical literature.56  Submission of a reimbursement claim for an off-
label prescription that is not eligible for reimbursement is likely to 
trigger the FCA. 
A manufacturer, or its agent, will be liable under the FCA for 
making a statement—irrespective of its truth—about the drug, when 
that statement causes the off-label prescription of a drug that is to be 
paid for by Medicare or Medicaid.57  For example, suppose a 
pharmaceutical salesman enters a doctor’s office and tells the 
physician “Drug X is useful for treatment of Indication Y.”  Drug X, 
however, is only approved for the treatment of Indication Z.  Further 
suppose that the physician then writes a prescription for Drug X to 
her patient for treatment of Indication Y.  The submission of said 
prescription for payment by Medicare or Medicaid would trigger the 
FCA.58 
Surprisingly, it is possible to trigger the FCA without ever 
making an untruthful, inaccurate, or dishonest representation.59  The 
truthful speech of a detailer that ultimately leads to a patient 
submitting a claim of reimbursement for an off-label prescription can 
form the basis of prosecution under the FCA by the government.60  
What creates the violation—whether it is the submission for 
reimbursement or the speech—can have a potentially significant 
impact on future First Amendment challenges to prosecution of off-
label marketing restrictions under the FCA.   
iii. Implications of Prosecution under FDCA and FCA 
The current laws have important implications for the 
manufacturing and marketing of prescription drugs.  First, 
pharmaceutical companies are significantly restricted in what they 
can say about their products, truthful or not.  As noted above, the 
regulations do not focus on the truthfulness of marketing 
statements.61  Second, the regulations encourage pharmaceutical 
companies to seek amended secondary approval for additional 
“intended uses.”62  This process requires pharmaceutical companies 
to reenter the FDA drug approval process to receive FDA approval for 
 
 56  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6) (2012). 
 57  Id. at 310. 
 58  Cf. Osbourne, supra note 11, at 329–30. 
 59  Id. at 331–32. 
 60  Id. 
 61  See supra Part II.B.ii. 
 62  See supra Part II.A. 
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the additional uses of the medication.63  This allows the manufacturer 
to change the product label to include additional indications.  Once 
the label is changed, the manufacturer may legally market its product 
for that purpose, without facing liability under the FDCA and FCA.64  
Maintaining this requirement ensures that the FDA has reviewed the 
new uses and observed their safety and efficacy. 
Good Reprint guidelines can inhibit manufacturers from 
distributing certain types of materials and how they must be 
distributed.65  This is contrary to physicians’ freedom to conduct, 
discuss, and distribute information related to off label uses, provided 
they use appropriate medical diligence.66  Additionally, manufacturer 
financial contributions they might have provided to the reprinted 
peer reviewed research must be disclosed.67   
The FDA, however, has established certain safe-harbors that 
allow for manufacturers to distribute and reprint such information.68  
For example, if a drug company wants to educate doctors about the 
benefits of its drug for an off-label use, it is not permitted to 
 
 63  See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2012) (“Any drug (except a new animal drug or an 
animal feed bearing or containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is 
such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific 
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and 
effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
labeling thereof.”); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a) (West 2012) (“No person shall 
introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless 
an approval of an application”); Dresser, supra note 4, at 477–78. 
 64  See 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(a) (West 2012); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.100(d)(1) 
(2006). 
 65  Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or 
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or 
Cleared Medical Devices, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/regulatory 
information/guidances/ucm125126.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (clarifying the 
existing safe harbors and violations for pharmaceutical manufacturers that wish to 
distribute information to physicians and other third parties about effective off label 
uses of their products).Manufacturers are, however, permitted to disseminate 
reprints of peer reviewed journal articles that result from research the manufacturer 
funds, provided they disclose the financial relationship.  See Id. 
 66  See generally, Randall S. Stafford, M.D., Ph.D, Regulating Off-label Drug Use—
Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1427, 1428 (Apr. 3, 2008). 
 67  See generaly, id. 
 68  Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or 
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or 
Cleared Medical Devices, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/regulatory 
information/guidances/ucm125126.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (“safe harbor” 
exists “for a manufacturer that complies with [the applicable statutes and 
regulations] before and while disseminating journal articles and reference 
publications about ‘unapproved new uses’ of approved or cleared products”). 
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unilaterally finance the research.69  In order to distribute any 
documents relating to the off-label use of a product, the 
independently produced publication should be peer reviewed, 
published by an organization with an expert editorial board, and 
should not be financed in whole or in part by the manufacturer.70  
Only then can the drug manufacturer distribute the information, and 
even still the FDA provides strict guidelines.71  Furthermore, the 
information must be an unabridged reprint, free of markings or 
highlighting, accompanied by a bibliography of similar works, 
disseminated with contrary data if available, and distributed 
separately from any information that is promotional in nature.72 
Both of these mechanisms—the FDCA and the FCA—give the 
Justice Department sufficient firepower to prosecute off-label 
marketing violations.  The penalties associated with such 
prosecutions are severe, in some cases exceeding one billion dollars.73  
These large fines give pharmaceutical companies sufficient incentive 
to challenge the current regulations.  It is more than likely that in the 
near future we will see new constitutional challenges to the off-label 
marketing regulations.  Further, this future challenge is likely to rely 
heavily on the recent Supreme Court decision in Sorrell. 
 
 
 69  Id. (“A scientific or medical reference publication that is distributed should 
not be . . . edited or significantly influenced by a drug or device manufacturer or any 
individuals having a financial relationship with the manufacturer.”). 
 70  Id. (“A scientific or medical journal article that is distributed should: be 
published by an organization that has an editorial board that uses experts who have 
demonstrated expertise in the subject of the article under review by the organization 
and who are independent of the organization to review and objectively select, reject, 
or provide comments about proposed articles.”). 
 71  Id. (“The information contained in the scientific or medical journal article or 
reference publication should address adequate and well-controlled clinical 
investigations that are considered scientifically sound by experts with scientific 
training and experience to evaluate the safety or effectiveness of the drug or 
device.”). 
 72  Id. (“Scientific or medical information that is distributed should: be in the 
form of an unabridged reprint, copy of an article, or reference publication; not be 
marked, highlighted, summarized, or characterized by the manufacturer in any way 
(except to provide the accompanying disclosures discussed in this section; . . . be 
distributed separately from information that is promotional in nature.”). 
 73  See Kevin Outterson. The Last Drug Company Settlement for Off-Label Promotion, 
THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2011), http://theincidentaleconomist.com 
/wordpress/the-last-drug-company-settlement-for-off-label-promotion/. 
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III. SORRELL AND OTHER CASE LAW THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO 
FUTURE COURT DECISIONS 
Part III will focus on relevant case law that is likely to impact a 
future challenge to the off-label marketing prohibitions.  Section A 
begins by discussing the Supreme Court decision in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health.  This section considers and outlines relevant issues, rationales, 
and legal analyses.  Section B of Part III then discusses other cases 
that could be influential for a future challenge. 
A. Discussion of Sorrell v. IMS Health 
i. Issue Presented 
Sorrell addresses the protection of commercial speech as it relates 
to a drug company’s ability to solicit physician prescriptions and a 
pharmacy’s ability to profit from the information gathered about 
physicians.74  The Court held that both the pharmaceutical company’s 
right to market to physicians, as well as the pharmacy’s right to 
distribute information about physicians, are protected by the First 
Amendment.75  Pharmaceutical companies use a practice called 
“detailing” to market their products to physicians.76  In order to make 
their marketing efforts more efficient, drug companies often 
purchase information about a physician’s prescription practices.77 
In 2007, Vermont enacted legislation to curb this practice, 
believing that sales of this type of private information were dangerous 
to the public.78  The Vermont law proscribed selling, disclosing, and 
using pharmacy records if they contain physician prescription 
practices..79  Except for a limited number of exceptions, the sale or 
disclosure of this information by pharmacies for marketing, nor is the 
information lawfully used by pharmaceutical manufacturers or 
marketers for marketing efforts.80  Limited circumstances include 
when a prescriber consents to use of the information. 
Lower courts were at odds about the legality of this legislation.  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont denied to provide 
relief; the court determined the legislation was a permissible use of 
the State’s police power for the protection of the health, safety, and 
 
 74  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. at 2659–60. 
 78  Id. at 2660. 
 79  Id. at 2660 (citing VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4631 (Supp. 2010)). 
 80  Id. 
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welfare of its citizens.81  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the law presented an 
unjustified burden on First Amendment speech interests.82  The 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Vermont law imposed  
speaker- and content-based restrictions on speech.83 
ii. Determining a Level of Scrutiny 
One of the more interesting aspects of Sorrell was the Court’s 
decision not to use the Central Hudson test for commercial speech.84  
Instead, the Court decided that the regulation should be considered 
both a content- and speaker-based regulation on its face.85  The law, 
by singling out participants in the pharmaceutical industry as 
prohibited recipients of the prescriber identified information, 
created a speaker-based restriction.86  Additionally, because the 
legislation proscribed the information’s use for “marketing,” but no 
other purposes, the law also constituted a content-based restriction.87  
Each of these findings—speaker- and content-based prohibitions—
trigger heightened judicial review requiring the state to show that the 
legislation directly advances a substantial interest, and that the 
legislation is narrowly drawn to achieve those ends.88  Under the level 
of scrutiny required for content-based restrictions, the state must also 
show that there is a proportional relationship between the state’s 
asserted purpose and the subsequent burden on speech.89 
iii. Court’s Findings 
The Sorrell Court held that the State was unable to withstand 
scrutiny with its asserted government interests: first, medical privacy 
(encompassing physician confidentiality, protection of physician 
harassment, and maintenance of physician patient relationship) and, 
second, improved public health and reduced healthcare costs.90  The 
 
 81  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 435 (D.Vt. 2009). 
 82  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 630 F.3d 263, 282 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 83  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672. 
 84  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980).  The Central Hudson test requires 1) speech be legal and not misleading 2) 
the government has a substantial interest, 3) the interest is directly advanced, and 4) 
the burden on speech is proportionally related to the State interest.  Id. at 564. 
 85  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. at 2664. 
 90  Id. at 2668. 
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Court rejected the first purpose—a need for medical privacy.91  The 
Court also believed that this end could have been reached in a 
number of less restrictive ways.92  Additionally, the Court rejected the 
proposed purpose cited by the State.  The State contended that the 
legislation was meant to prevent harassment of physicians.93  The 
Court rejected this interest, noting that physicians intending to limit 
pharmaceutical detailing and marketing efforts at their practice 
could have merely placed signs warning marketers that solicitation 
was not wanted.94  Finally, the Court rejected the State’s assertion that 
the law was designed to maintain appropriate physician-patient 
relationships.95  In a forceful statement, the Court referred to 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, stating that “if pharmaceutical marketing affects 
treatment decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive . . . . 
[T]he fear that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for 
quieting it.”96 
Next, the Court dismissed the State’s contention that the law 
advances public policy goals by lowering healthcare costs because the 
law did not advance these substantial interests in a permissible way.97  
When legislation infringes on speech as drastically as the Vermont 
law did, it must be drafted in a narrow manner that directly achieves 
the state’s ends.98 
As a result of these observations, the majority held that the law 
was unduly broad, with burdens on speech that outweighed the 
benefits of the intended government interests.99  This result 
demonstrates that states attempting to restrict the marketing 
practices of pharmaceutical companies, and of other producers of 
healthcare information, will have to craft their legislation in a speech 
neutral manner Further, the Court noted that the result of this case 
would not have been different had the law been analyzed using the 
Central Hudson framework,100 as will likely be seen in future off-label 
 
 91  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668–70. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 2669–70. 
 94  Id. at 2670. 
 95  Id. at 2670. 
 96  Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
 97  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
564 (1980) (holding that restrictions on commercial speech do not violate the First 
Amendment if : (1) the speech is lawful and non-misleading, (2) the government has 
a substantial interest in regulating the speech, (3) the regulation directly advances 
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marketing challenges.101  Most importantly for the issue of off-label 
marketing, the majority seemed extremely sympathetic to the 
position that, in the context of commercial marketing, truthful 
information should not be blocked by a state.102 
B. Other Relevant Case Law to an Eventual First Amendment Challenge 
of the Off-Label Marketing Regulatory Scheme. 
Challenging off-label marketing practices is not an entirely new 
concept.  These challenges, however, have not yet reached the 
Supreme Court.103  In the future, the Sorrell opinion will serve as a 
powerful resource for manufacturers challenging prosecution under 
the FDCA and FCA.  In fact, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied heavily on Sorrell when the court decided United States v. 
Caronia.104  Before moving on to discuss the basis of a future 
challenge, it is important to note some previous challenges of off-
label marketing regulations. 
i.  Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman 
In the 1998 case Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman,105 the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the federal 
off-label marketing guidance documents were a violation of corporate 
First Amendment rights to free speech.106  The court analyzed the 
First Amendment issue using the Central Hudson framework for 
commercial speech.107  The court first determined that the speech at 
issue was commercial.108  The court then scrutinized whether the FDA 
guidelines directly advanced a “substantial” government interest.109 
 
the government interest, and (4) there are not less restrictive alternatives). 
 101  See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 102  See id. 
 103  See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998); 
Greater Access to Generic Drugs: New FDA Initiatives to Improve the Drug Review Process and 
Reduce Legal Loopholes, supra note 7. 
 104  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 105  Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51. 
 106  Id. at 74. 
 107  Id. at 65.  The court’s use of the Central Hudson standard is contrary to what is 
expected in future challenges to the FDA guidelines regarding off-label marketing.  
Id. at 65.  Instead, similar to the position taken in Sorrell, courts will likely interpret 
the FDA guidelines as “content-based” and “speaker-based” restrictions on speech.  
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663.  The court will likely move directly to a strict scrutiny 
analysis that requires a finding of a “compelling” government interest that is 
“directly” related to achieving that purpose.  Id. at 2668–69. 
 108  Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51. 
 109  Id. at 65. 
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The FDA attempted to justify the regulations, claiming that the 
restrictions were a valid use of the State’s police power to protect 
public health and safety.110  The State asserted two substantial 
interests that it believed the FDA guidance documents directly 
advanced111: first, ensuring that physicians received accurate and 
unbiased information that permits them to make educated treatment 
decisions,112 and second, ensuring that companies seek approval for 
previously unapproved uses of their drugs when approved drugs have 
unapproved uses.113  The court found that the former purpose did not 
constitute a substantial interest, while the latter was sufficiently 
substantial to warrant restrictions on speech.114 
Having found a substantial interest, the next question became 
whether the FDA guidance documents directly advanced the State’s 
purpose in a material way.115  The court held that the guidance 
documents directly advanced the purpose mainly because they 
provided an incentive to encourage manufacturers to seek approvals 
for additional indications.116  Due to the patent laws relating to 
generic drugs, and the high cost of seeking FDA approval, the court 
found that there were few other options apart from restricting the 
manufacturers’ marketing practices.117  The scope of the restriction, 
however, led the court to determine that the FDA guidelines were 
unconstitutionally extensive.118  The guidance documents were overly 
burdensome on the manufacturers’ speech because significantly less 
 
 110  See id. at 57. 
 111  Wash. Legal Found.,13 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
 112  Id. at 69.  Ultimately, the court held that the purpose of protecting doctors 
from making misinformed decisions was not a substantial interest.  Id.  This holding 
was based on the fact that physicians are highly sophisticated and capable of making 
well thought out, knowledgeable treatment decisions.  Id.  The paternalistic 
approach of protecting doctors was not valid; the court felt that doctors would be 
better equipped by receiving as much information as possible to make an informed 
treatment decision.  Id. 
 113  Id. at 70–72.  The court held that this second interest was substantially 
compelling, and could justify a restriction on free speech so long as it directly 
achieved that end.  Id.  The fact that Congress reiterated that the approval 
requirement must be met for all drugs, and is not subject to any exceptions, 
convinced the court that the government interest was substantial.  Id. at 71. 
 114  Id. at 69–72. 
 115  Id. at 72 (“What the court must determine is whether the Guidance 
Documents directly advance the ‘subsequent approval’ interest: do they encourage 
and/or compel a drug manufacturer to submit previously approved drugs to the FDA 
for approval of the off-label treatments?”). 
 116  Id. 
 117  Washington Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 72. 
 118  Id. at 72–74. 
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intrusive means existed to accomplish the same ends.119  Incentive to 
seek approval for off-label indications remained because, even if the 
limitations on “independently sponsored” continuing medical 
education (CME) and reprint distribution were lifted, direct 
marketing to physicians, internally produced off-label marketing 
publications, and company-sponsored CME seminars would still 
remain unlawful.120  The court therefore concluded that the FDA 
guidelines violated the First Amendment.  This result, however, was 
short-lived, and the case was dismissed prior to reaching the Court of 
Appeals.  While the decision set down by the district court is not 
binding on any other federal courts, it does offer a possible 
interpretation of off-label marketing regulations. 
ii. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center 
A second case, decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, addressed the issue of drug manufacturers’ commercial 
speech rights.121  In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court 
held that portions of the regulations set out in the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) restricting drug 
manufacturers from advertising, promoting, or soliciting 
prescriptions for certain compounded drugs constituted a violation 
of the First Amendment under a Central Hudson commercial speech 
analysis.122  The relevant provision in the FDAMA stated that drug 
manufacturers of compounded drugs are exempt from the rigorous 
FDA approval process so long as they refrain from marketing their 
products.123  The Court delved into a Central Hudson analysis to 
 
 119  Id. The less intrusive means focused most heavily on mandatory disclosure.  
Disclosure would assuage the governments concerns with potentially misleading 
physicians.  Id.  Additionally, companies would still have significant incentive to seek 
re-approval because the decision in this case was narrow.  Id.  Direct marketing to 
physicians, pharmaceutical company initiated seminars, and internally produced and 
distributed marketing materials all fell outside the scope of this decision.  Id. 
 120  Id. at 73 (“[I]t is a very narrow form of manufacturer communication upon 
which this court is ruling in enjoining enforcement of the Guidance Documents.  
There still are enormous differences between the permitted marketing of on-label as 
opposed to off-label uses.  Manufacturers still are proscribed from producing and 
distributing any internally-produced marketing materials to physicians concerning 
off-label uses, or from involvement with seminars not conducted by an ‘independent 
program provider.’  Nor may the drug companies initiate person-to-person contact 
with a physician about an off-label use.  Nor may they advertise off-label uses for 
previously approved drugs directly to the consumer.”). 
 121  Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 122  Id. at 373–74. 
 123  21 U.S.C. § 353a(c) (2006) (“A drug may be compounded under subsection 
(a) of this section only if the pharmacy, licensed pharmacist, or licensed physician 
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determine the constitutionality of such provisions.124  After the Court 
determined that the speech was lawful, the State proffered three 
explanations of the substantial nature of the regulations.125  The State 
asserted that the regulation: (1) ensured the integrity and 
effectiveness of the new drug approval process and its impact on 
public health; (2) preserved the availability of compounded drugs for 
patients that have not had success with other available drugs; and (3) 
managed a balance between these first two objectives.126  The Court 
accepted these reasons as substantial; however, it struck down the 
legislation because the law failed to meet the fourth prong of the 
Central Hudson analysis—that there must not be less restrictive means 
to achieve the stated governmental interest.127  The Court believed 
that a number of speech-neutral means existed to promote the 
asserted government ends, and determined the provision to be 
unconstitutional.128 
Beyond the strict rule of law applied in Thompson, the Court also 
provided some powerful dicta that could be applicable for future 
challenges to the off-label marketing regulations.  The Court cited a 
number of commercial speech cases leading up to Thompson, 
illustrating the sentiment towards commercial speech.  For example, 
in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
the Court stated, “[i]t is a matter of public interest that [economic] 
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.  To this 
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”129  
Such a statement is pertinent within scientific and medical 
commercial speech more so than anywhere else.  In an age when 
 
does not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of 
drug, or type of drug.  The pharmacy, licensed pharmacist, or licensed physician may 
advertise and promote the compounding service provided by the licensed pharmacist 
or licensed physician.”). This provision was declared unconstitutional in Thompson 
and, rather than severing the section from the statute, the Court declared the entire 
statute unconstitutional.  Thompson, 535 U.S. at 357. 
 124  Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368. 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. at 371 (“[I]f the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that 
does not restrict, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”). 
 128  Id. at 372–73.  The Court noted the government could have used at least three 
other mechanisms to achieve patient safety while still making the compounding 
practice available to needy patients.  Id.  They noted a ban on commercial scale 
manufacturing, restrictions on preemptive production of compounding products in 
expectation of future prescriptions, and prohibitions on wholesale sales of 
compounding products to other licensed individuals.  Id. 
 129  Id. at 366 (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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patients increasingly seek information about their treatment and 
illnesses, it is important this medical information be available to 
them.  Again, in assessing the role of government in determining 
whether commercial speech has a positive or negative effect on the 
public, the Court noted that “the general rule is that the speaker and 
the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information 
presented.”130  The dissent pointed out that there is a government 
interest in the prevention of marketing efforts that persuade doctors 
to treat their patients using a certain marketed protocol.131  The 
majority vehemently rejected the point, however, stating that “[t]he 
First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations 
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government 
perceives to be their own good.”132  Thus, the paternalistic legislative 
approach is a method that the Court seems to strongly disfavor. 
iii. United States v. Caronia 
In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued 
an already controversial decision in United States v. Caronia, a decision 
that cut one of the enforcement legs out from underneath the FDA.133  
The court determined that the prosecution of truthful speech 
through the FDCA’s misbranding provisions is unconstitutional and a 
violation of the First Amendment.134 
Defendant Caronia worked as a detailer for Orphan Medical, 
Inc., the manufacturer of the drug Xyrem.135  Xyrem was approved by 
the FDA for only two medical indications: cataplexy and excessive 
day-time sleepiness associated with narcolepsy.136  During a meeting 
with a physician, Caronia stated that the drug could be used to treat 
restless leg syndrome and pain associated with fibromyalgia.137  The 
Government recorded this conversation, and eventually prosecuted 
 
 130  Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 
(1993)). 
 131  Id. at 382–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The ideal process for prescription 
practices is that the original motivation for the need for the prescription comes from 
the physician, flowing from physician to patient to pharmacist.  Id. at 382.  The 
concern is that advertising will produce a system that originates a process of 
pharmacist to patient to doctor.  Id.  Many studies have shown that physicians will 
acquiesce to patients’ requests for specific medications.  Id. at 383–84. 
 132  Id. at 375 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133   United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at 155–56. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. at 156. 
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Caronia for violating the FDCA’s misbranding provisions.138 
In its decision, the court focused on the State’s contention that 
the promotional speech itself constituted impermissible 
misbranding.139  The court rejected the State’s argument that the 
promotional speech was not criminalized in itself; instead the court 
found that the speech only served as evidence of intent to 
misbrand.140  The court found that the misbranding provisions of 
FDCA represented both content- and speaker-based restrictions.141  
The provisions established a content-based restriction because they 
favored truthful on-label speech over truthful off-label speech.142  The 
provisions established a speaker-based restriction because physicians 
can promote off-label uses with impunity but detailers are restricted 
from making the same truthful promotions.143 
Although suggesting that strict scrutiny should apply to the 
provisions, the court employed the lesser Central Hudson test.144  The 
court determined that the State’s interests were not directly 
advanced, nor were they narrowly drawn, to achieve the State’s 
objectives.145  The court rejected State’s interest in protecting the 
integrity of the FDA approval process by ensuring manufacturers 
have an incentive to seek re-approval.146  The court reasoned that the 
simple fact that off-label prescribing is lawful undermines the State’s 
asserted interest that off-label restrictions are needed to encourage 
companies to seek re-approval.147  The majority also held that the 
regulations were not narrowly drawn because other options, such as 
warnings for drugs prescribed off-label, ceilings for the amounts of a 
drug that can be prescribed off-label, or outright prohibition of off-
label prescribing, would all appropriately achieve the State’s 
interest.148 
Caronia gives rise to a number of interesting evaluations.  First, 
the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell to 
assist in the determination that the provisions represented a content- 
 
 138  Id. at 156–57. 
 139  Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160. 
 140  Id. at 161–62. 
 141  Id. at 165. 
 142  Id. at 165–69. 
 143  Id. at 165. 
 144  Id. at 165. 
 145  Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166–69. 
 146  Id. at 166–68. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. at 168. 
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and speaker-based restriction.149  As noted above, in Sorrell, the 
Court’s finding that the Vermont statute was a content- and speaker-
based restriction represented a novel approach to a First Amendment 
challenge brought on behalf of a commercial company.150  Second, 
the court’s decision to disregard a strict scrutiny standard, although 
applicable, and instead strike down the provision under the less-
onerous Central Hudson test, was fairly unexpected.151  Finally, the 
scope of the Caronia decision is admittedly narrow by only making a 
determination on the constitutionality of prosecution under the 
FDCA’s misbranding provisions, the court did not in any way address 
the constitutionality of enforcement of off-label marketing violations 
under the FCA.152  These observations will surely play a substantial 
role in any potential future appeal to the Supreme Court, but at this 
point it is not known if the case will rise to the nation’s highest court. 
The cases above establish a valid argument for both sides in this 
debate.  The rejection of the State’s interest, to encourage companies 
to seek reapproval for off label indications,  in Caronia is contrary to 
the District of D.C.’s support of the same interest in Washington Legal 
Foundation.  Whether the Supreme Court will follow suit is unclear; 
the following section provides an overview of what the Supreme 
Court’s analysis might look like based upon these and other 
considerations. 
V. THE LIKELY ARGUMENTS AND SUPREME COURT CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR THE POTENTIAL CHALLENGE AGAINST THE CURRENT REGULATORY 
MECHANISM WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO SORRELL’S IMPACT ON 
THE COURT’S ANALYSIS 
Sorrell is relevant to future challenges to off-label marketing 
restrictions for a number of reasons.  First, the case provides 
important dicta that provide an intimate look at the Court’s thoughts 
on commercial speech within the context of the healthcare industry.  
Second, Sorrell provides an analysis of a free speech challenge that 
ultimately received heightened scrutiny.  Sorrell will provide an 
analogous opinion if a future challenge requires application of 
heightened scrutiny.  The Sorrell opinion also provides a comparison 
to the Central Hudson framework that the courts could easily apply to 
the off-label promotion restrictions.  Finally, the Court in Sorrell 
 
 149  See generally id. at 163–64. 
 150  See infra, Part III.A. 
 151  Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164. 
 152  Cf. id. at 164. 
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clarified that it is unlikely that the ruling will be any different whether 
the case proceeds on a scientific speech or commercial speech 
scrutiny framework.153 
The misbranding provisions of the FDCA and the provisions 
under the FCA do not pose facially burdensome speech restrictions, 
but enforcement of off-label restrictions under these provisions as 
applied creates both content and speaker-based restrictions.154  For 
example, the only possible violator of the FDCA’s regulation on the 
“intended use” is an agent of a company speaking on behalf of the 
company’s product.155  The same information that would trigger a 
violation if mentioned by a corporate agent would be perfectly lawful 
if discussed or disseminated by any unconnected physician, 
researcher, scholar, or businessman.156  This is an analogous situation 
to that presented in Sorrell.  There, the Court noted that “Vermont’s 
law thus has the effect of preventing detailers—and only detailers—
from communicating with physicians in an effective and informative 
manner.”157  Similarly, prosecution guidelines under FDCA restrict 
only pharmaceutical manufacturers and their agents from 
communicating truthful off-label information about their products to 
physicians.158 
Additionally, the FDA regulation of off-label promotion could 
potentially be deemed to create a content-based restriction on 
speech.  As stated in Sorrell, “[c]ontent-neutral speech regulations are 
those that are justified without reference to content of regulated 
speech.”159  In the case of off-label restrictions, the law is enforced to 
favor speech relating to on-label drug use and disfavors speech 
pertaining to off-label medications.160  Similar to the findings of Sorrell 
and Caronia, by burdening specific content of speech—namely off-
 
 153  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). 
 154  See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164. 
 155  Id. at 165. 
 156  See U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006).  The regulations permit physicians, researchers, 
publications, and the general public to endorse the use of pharmaceuticals for off-
label indications.  Id.  This permission is not expressly given; however, it is inferred 
because off-label marketing is patrolled using labeling restrictions.  Id.  Because 
pharmaceutical companies are the only manufacturers of these labels, they are the 
only entities that are restricted from promoting the off-label uses.  Id.; see also Use of 
Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 4 (1982), available at 
http://www.circare.org/fda/fdadrugbulletin_041982.pdf. 
 157  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663. 
 158  See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 159  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at  2664. (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 
41, 48 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160  21 C.F.R. §§ 201.100(d)(1) (2006). 
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label uses of pharmaceutical products—the Court will likely conclude 
that the provisions of both the FDCA and FCA are content-based 
restrictions. 
If the Supreme Court determines that the FCA or FDCA creates 
either a content- or speaker-based restriction, the government would 
be forced to meet heightened scrutiny standards; this would require 
the government to show the regulation serves a compelling state 
interest, the regulation is directly crafted to serve that interest, and 
the regulation does not burden speech more than needed to achieve 
the state interest.161  Such a challenge presents significant potential 
for success, as less intrusive alternatives for achieving the 
government’s asserted purposes exist.162 
If the FDA’s off-label regulatory mechanisms are deemed 
content- or speaker-based restrictions by the Supreme Court, the 
probable interest that the state will assert is its desire to prevent 
companies from seeking limited approval of a drug for a specified 
use, and then marketing that drug for a host of unproven uses.163  For 
example, Drug Manufacturer X creates “Drug Z” and seeks approval 
for treatment of high blood pressure.  Drug Manufacturer X also 
believes that the drug can be used to treat anxiety, erectile 
dysfunction, mood stabilization, and a host of other ailments.  The 
company would be free to market “Drug Z” to physicians for any of 
these reasons without ever completing the large-scale clinical trial 
studies required to obtain initial FDA approval.  This process poses a 
potentially dangerous threat to public safety that many regulators 
believe should be restricted.164 
The final step the Court will need to consider is whether less 
speech restrictive alternatives can achieve this state interest.  It has 
been determined by at least one court, that a number of less intrusive 
means exist to achieve the government’s asserted end.  For example, 
in Caronia the court determined that warnings on off-label drugs, 
ceilings for the amounts of a drug that can be prescribed off-label, or 
outright prohibition of off-label prescribing, would all appropriately 
achieve the state’s interest.165  These alternatives all represent feasible 
options, and the most useful mechanism, a quota system, is evaluated 
in more detail below.166 
 
 161  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 162  See infra Part IV.A. 
 163  See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C 1998).   
 164  Stafford, supra note 2; see also Dresser, supra note 4. 
 165  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 166  Infra Part VI. 
IRAGGI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  2:07 PM 
2013] COMMENT 1159 
Although there is significant evidence to indicate that the Court 
will find this speech to be scientific, it is possible that the Court will 
analyze the off-label promotion restrictions under the Central 
Hudson—commercial speech—guidelines.167  As evidenced by the 
Caronia decision, the result is largely the same whether the court 
utilizes the Central Hudson framework or the heightened scrutiny 
standard used in Sorrell.168  Under the heightened scrutiny analysis, 
any plaintiff is likely to point out the multitude of less invasive 
methods to achieve the asserted government interest. The Court’s 
analysis is likely to hinge on whether alternatives exist to encourage 
companies to seek full FDA approval of off-label indications.169  The 
list of alternative options proposed in Caronia provides future 
plaintiffs with a good start, as the Court could potentially consider a 
quota system as a potential replacement for the current regulatory 
structure.170 
These considerations, taken in combination with Sorrell’s 
incredibly sympathetic dicta regarding the protection of free speech 
in the context of educating physicians, seem to indicate that the 
Supreme Court will prefer less speech-restrictive alternatives in the 
future.171  In Sorrell, the Court rejected the argument that granting 
detailers greater latitude would negatively affect the treatment of 
patients.172  In fact, this gives rise to the most telling sentiment of the 
Court; the majority stated, “[i]f pharmaceutical marketing affects 
treatment decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive.”173  
The Court seems inclined to allow physicians to distill what 
information is relevant to medical treatment.  The Court followed by 
again noting, “[t]here are divergent views regarding detailing and the 
prescription of brand-name drugs.  Under the Constitution, 
resolution of that debate must result from free and uninhibited 
 
 167  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
564 (1980). 
 168  Caronia, 703 F.3d 149; Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 
(2011). 
 169  The plaintiff’s argument is likely to mention some of the arguments presented 
in Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002), a precedential case that 
noted less intrusive means could include: prohibition on the sales of certain products 
to other licensed individuals, restrictions on preemptive production of compounding 
products, and bans on manufacturing. 
 170  Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168. 
 171  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–71 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 
357, 374 (2002).  (“[T]he fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful 
information cannot justify content based burdens on speech.”)). 
 172  Id. at 2669–71. 
 173  Id. 
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speech.”174  The sentiments of the Court are tempered by the ability 
of the government to achieve its interest in a less intrusive manner.  
The threshold issue moving forward will be whether there are any 
speech-neutral alternatives to achieve the government interest. 
VI. PRESCRIPTION DRUG QUOTA SYSTEMS AS A SPEECH NEUTRAL 
ALTERNATIVE FOR ACHIEVING THE STATE’S SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST: 
UTILIZING THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS AS A 
ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
The government’s primary underlying interest for maintaining 
off-label marketing restrictions for pharmaceutical manufacturers—
to encourage companies to seek full FDA approval for off-label 
indications—can be achieved without burdening corporate speech 
rights.  Establishing a quota system is a realistic alternative to the 
current regulatory structure.  For the purpose of this Comment, the 
proposed quota system would serve as a ceiling for drug 
manufacturers; when a manufacturer sells a certain number, or 
percentage, of prescriptions for an off-label indication, the company 
would be required to seek FDA approval for this off-label indication. 
Given the current state of networking technology and 
prescription monitoring program laws, establishing a realistic 
infrastructure that would enable the FDA to track the number of 
prescriptions issued for off-label indications is a feasible speech-
neutral option designed to quell the above concern.175  Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) have made substantial 
advancements within the last decade.176  Currently, 49 states have 
PDMP laws, 41 of which have operational programs; this is a three-
fold increase from the 16 states that had passed PDMP legislation in 
2001.177  Technology developed by the American Society for 
Automation in Pharmacy (ASAP) represents the uniform standard 
for PDMPs.178  Recent versions of ASAP system have increased the 
number of data fields it collects, making inclusion of the off-label 
nature of the prescription possible using this technology.179  While the 
rapid expansion of PDMPs is encouraging, the government would 
 
 174  Id. at 2671. 
 175  THOMAS CLARK ET AL., PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE FOR BEST PRACTICES 5 (Sept. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.pdmpexcellence.org/sites/all/pdfs/Brandeis_PDMP_Report.pdf. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. at 4. 
 179  Id. at 13. 
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need to implement these PDMPs on a national scale.  It appears that 
this is possible. 
Currently, the shortcomings of the reporting infrastructure are 
too great to easily incorporate the inclusion of an off-label indication 
dataset; however, adoption of the most recent ASAP software would 
permit inclusion of off-label tracking.180  Despite this ability, some 
shortcomings of the current PDMP infrastructure should be noted 
for the purpose of understanding how the system should be altered. 
First, the use of electronic prescribing is not yet the industry 
standard.  New York did, however, pass legislation in 2012 that 
mandated all controlled substance prescriptions be issued 
electronically by the end of 2014.181  This is the first mandatory E-
prescription law in the country.182  The program requires reporting of 
more than ten different data fields to the system.183  Second, not all 
states adopt identical PDMP legislation, making the fluidity of 
amending the laws cumbersome at a national level.184  The Alliance of 
States with Prescription Monitoring Programs established a Model 
PMP Act in 2010 that can potentially serve as the national standard.185  
Third, two-thirds of reporting programs do not require reporting for 
drugs that are not Schedule II controlled substances.186  The 
reporting system would have to be mandatory for all prescription 
drugs to appropriately address the off-label prescription issue. 
A federal law establishing a national database capable of 
handling the reporting of off-label prescriptions would need to be 
passed for a quota system to become feasible.  The law should have a 
couple key characteristics.  First, a national database or, at a 
minimum, a system that creates uniformity among all state data 
collection procedures, must be implemented.187  This system would 
have to require tracking of all prescriptions.  Second, the federal 
 
 180  Id. 
 181  Med. Soc’y of the State of N.Y., I-STOP Law: MSSNY Working to Assure 
MSSNY Physician Participation on DOH Work Group on Prescription Pain 
Medication Awareness, online available at: http://www.mssny.org/mssnycfm/mssny 
editor/File/2013/Home/I-STOP_010813/I_STOP_MEMO.pdf. 
 182  Id. 
 183  N.Y. Senate, Legislative Drafting Commission, 12123-11-2, Program Bill #39, 
Part (A) § 3343-a(b). 
 184  CLARK ET AL., supra note 175, at 13. 
 185  Prescription Monitoring Program Model Act 2010 Revision, ALLIANCE OF STATES 
WITH PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAMS (June 28, 2010), available at 
pmpalliance.org/pdf/PMPModelActFinal20100628.pdf. 
 186  CLARK ET AL., supra note 175, at 14. 
 187  Id. at 13. 
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government would likely need to implement, and require use of, 
nationally standardized prescription pads, or e-script systems.  These 
prescription forms should include a mechanism to record that the 
drug is being prescribed for an off-label indication.188  These are not 
unrealistic requirements, particularly if adoption of modern ASAP 
technology is made the national standard.189  One potential method 
for ensuring uniform adoption of these procedures is incentivizing 
state participation through the Federal Harold Rogers Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Program.190  By refusing to provide monetary 
support to states adopting noncompliant versions of the PDMP’s 
uniform structure, it might provide enough incentive for those states 
to adopt the uniform infrastructure. 
A reporting system, as outlined above, would permit the FDA to 
track the number of prescriptions of a certain drug that could trigger 
obligatory re-approval of the drug for that indication.  This 
mandatory re-approval would likely achieve the state-interest in 
retaining the integrity of the FDA approval process.  For example, 
Drug X has been given initial approval for treatment of high blood 
pressure.  Doctors subsequently discover that it is useful for treating 
anxiety.  The pharmaceutical company then begins soliciting the 
prescription of the drug for the treatment of anxiety—an action that 
is currently prohibited, but would not be restricted if the Supreme 
Court abolishes off-label marketing restrictions.  The physician then 
prescribed the drug off-label to treat anxiety.  After approximately 
one year, it is clear that twenty-five percent of all prescriptions for 
Drug X are for the treatment of anxiety.  The company would then 
be required to initiate the FDA re-approval process for the treatment 
of anxiety—to alter the product’s approved labeling.  If the company 
failed to do so, it would be subject to heavy penalties. 
A quota system represents a realistic alternative to the current 
system.  Although moderate barriers exist to the establishment of a 
quota system, these hurdles are not prohibitive.  Accordingly, when 
consideration of this issue reaches the Supreme Court, the existence 
of speech neutral alternatives is likely to be the Government’s 
greatest liability. 
 
 188  Id. at 13. 
 189  Id. at 4. 
 190  Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/prescripdrugs 
.html. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The off-label promotion issue is quickly coming to a head, and is 
likely to find its way up to the Supreme Court in the future.  Based on 
the current state of the law, seen in Washington Legal, Thompson, and 
Caronia, as well as the relevant excerpts from Sorrell, it is likely that the 
off-label promotion regulation is in serious jeopardy.  It is important 
to keep in mind the importance of public health, safety, and welfare 
when considering a revision of the laws.  Developing systems to 
identify misleading assertions is among the most important aspects of 
the law.  Additionally, creating incentives for companies to seek FDA 
approval for off-label indications is crucial. 
While removing restrictions carries potential for corporate 
abuse, the valuable contribution that free-flowing information could 
contribute to patient safety might outweigh this danger.  Currently, it 
takes nearly twenty years for pharmaceuticals to get from “bench to 
bedside,” leaving desperate patients without potential treatment 
options because of bureaucratic red tape.  Removal of off-label 
marketing restrictions will increase the availability of data regarding 
potential uses of certain drugs.  Lifting the ban will also give the 
pharmaceutical companies incentive to perform research to support 
the use of their products for new indications. 
Sorrell may not have been the ground-breaking First Amendment 
case for which many pharmaceutical companies were hoping, but it 
certainly shed insight into the sentiments of the Court. The case 
hinted at the possibility that the Court might not even need to 
approach the off-label marketing issue from a commercial speech 
(Central Hudson) vantage point; rather the Court might move directly 
into heightened scrutiny based on the guideline’s establishment of 
content and speaker based restrictions.  In any event, the coming 
Supreme Court sessions will likely see a challenge to the off-label 
marketing regulations because of their undue infringement on 
corporate speech rights. 
The outcome of these cases will depend heavily on an analysis of 
feasible alternatives to the speech restrictive FDA guidelines.  While 
speech neutral quota systems would ultimately achieve the 
government’s compelling purpose, the system’s success rests heavily 
on important changes that must be made to the federal healthcare 
infrastructure.  If the Court deems such an alternative adequate, the 
FDA guidelines restricting off-label marketing could be overturned, a 
change that will likely send the FDA and legislators into a scramble to 
create workable regulations. 
 
